Many tools allow programmers to develop applications in highlevel languages and deploy them in web browsers via compilation to JavaScript. While practical and widely used, these compilers are ad hoc: no guarantee is provided on their correctness for whole programs, nor their security for programs executed within arbitrary JavaScript contexts. This paper presents a compiler with such guarantees. We compile an ML-like language with higher-order functions and references to JavaScript, while preserving all source program properties. Relying on type-based invariants and applicative bisimilarity, we show full abstraction: two programs are equivalent in all source contexts if and only if their wrapped translations are equivalent in all JavaScript contexts. We evaluate our compiler on sample programs, including a series of secure libraries.
Introduction
Many tools allow programmers to develop applications in highlevel languages and deploy them in web browsers via compilation to JavaScript. These include industrial compilers like GWT for Java, WebSharper and Pit for F#, and Dart, as well as several academic efforts like Links (Cooper et al. 2006) and Hop (Serrano et al. 2006) . While practical and, in some cases, widely used, these compilers are ad hoc: no guarantee is provided on their correctness for whole programs, nor their security for programs executed within arbitrary JavaScript contexts.
The lack of security against JavaScript contexts is of particular concern, since compiled code is routinely linked with libraries authored directly in JavaScript. Libraries like jQuery and Prototype are widely used, provide improved support for several core webprogramming tasks, but do so by making use of highly dynamic features of JavaScript, e.g., by redefining properties of predefined objects. Less well-known libraries are also routinely included in pages, often by simply including a pointer to the code served from a potentially untrustworthy URL. It is also common practice to include rich third-party content (e.g., advertisement scripts) in the same context as trusted JavaScript code. In all those cases, linking with a malicious or buggy script can easily break invariants of Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. POPL'13, January 23-25, 2013 Figure 1 . Architecture compiled code, compromise its security, and, in general, render any reasoning principles of the source programming language inapplicable to the JavaScript code that is actually executed. This paper presents a correct and secure compiler from a variant of ML with higher-order functions and references to JavaScript. Our main result is full abstraction: two programs are equivalent in all source contexts if and only if their translations are equivalent in all JavaScript contexts. Full abstraction is an ideal compiler property, inasmuch as it enables local reasoning on source code, without the need to understand the details of the compiler or the target platform. In our case, programmers can rely on their experience with ML, with static scopes and types, or trust source-level verification tools-and largely ignore the rather tricky semantics of JavaScript.
Which semantics for JavaScript? Compared to ML, the semantics of JavaScript is daunting. There are several different ECMA standards and various implementations (mainly by web browsers) that deviate from the standard in idiosyncratic ways. Maffeis et al. (2008) give an operational semantics for the ECMAScript 3 standard, which while extremely detailed, is also unwieldy in that it is not easily amenable to formal proof or to testing. An alternative approach is to give a semantics via translation to a simpler language, and then to test this translation semantics for compliance with browser implementations. This is the approach of Guha et al. (2010) , who give a translation of JavaScript into a mostly standard, dynamically typed lambda calculus called λ JS. The translation semantics is convenient for our purposes (e.g., it is executable) and not necessarily less precise or more complex. So, following λ JS, we give a semantics to JavaScript by elaboration to F ⋆ (Swamy et al. 2011 ), a variant of ML with richer types. We intend this semantics to capture the main features of the ECMAScript 5 standard, including features like getters and setters that were missing in λ JS. Our semantics also includes a number of experimental findings pertaining to implementation-specific features of JavaScript such as the arguments, caller, and callee properties.
A high-level view of the paper Figure 1 outlines our technical development. On the left, we have f ⋆ , a subset of F ⋆ that includes higher-order functions, mutable references, exceptions, and fatal errors, but excludes polymorphism for simplicity. Its semantics is parameterized by a type signature that defines the basic constants available to a program. On the right, we have concrete JavaScript.
Our compiler takes an f ⋆ program (src.f*) with an arbitrary signature and emits JavaScript syntax in two phases. The first phase (the 'light translation') is compositional and translates f ⋆ constructs to the corresponding ones in JavaScript, e.g., function closures to function closures, yielding src.js. For code meant to be executed in untrusted JavaScript contexts, we supplement the light translation with carefully crafted defensive wrappers (wrap.js) to securely import and export values at every source type while preserving the translation invariant.
To reason formally about our compiler, we reflect its output within an arbitrary JavaScript context back into f ⋆ . Specifically, we employ a variant of the λ JS semantics to translate JavaScript to js ⋆ , an instance of f ⋆ with a signature JSExec that provides runtime support for js ⋆ programs. Our proof of full abstraction relies on refinement typing to establish several key invariants of the translation. For this typing, we introduce JSVerify, a precise typed model of JSExec expressed using monadic refinement types in f ⋆ . Then, we develop a new eager-normal-form variant of applicative bisimilarity for contextual equivalence in f ⋆ and use it to show the main result of the paper, i.e., that two f ⋆ programs are equivalent with respect to an arbitrary f ⋆ context if, and only if, their defensively wrapped light translations are equivalent with respect to an arbitrary js ⋆ context. We summarize our main contributions below.
• We describe a compiler from f ⋆ ( §3) to JavaScript, including defensive wrappers to safely mediate interactions between translated programs and their context. ( §4)
• We introduce js ⋆ , a model of JavaScript within f ⋆ that includes security-relevant features of ECMAScript 5 and popular JavaScript implementations. ( §5)
• We formalize our compiler as a translation from f ⋆ to js ⋆ . We show that it is a forward simulation that preserves a typing and heap invariant. This yields safety and correctness for translations of closed programs executed in isolation. Additionally, by typing, we show that the defensive wrappers support safely exchanging values of various types with an untrusted context. ( §6)
• We develop a new co-inductive proof technique for f ⋆ , with labeled bisimulations to capture the interactions of configurations of related terms with their abstract context, such that bisimilarity coincides with contextual equivalence. ( §7)
• We prove our compiler from f ⋆ to js ⋆ fully abstract. ( §8)
• We close with a brief discussion and experimental evaluation of our compiler implementation. ( §9)
Disclaimer As usual, full abstraction holds only within our formal semantics of JavaScript, and various side channels may still exist in JavaScript implementations, based, for instance, on stack or heap exhaustion, or timing analysis. This presentation necessarily omits many details. Additional materials, including a technical report with the full formal development, an F ⋆ implementation with a JavaScript back-end, sample source and compiled programs, and an updated F ⋆ theory in Coq are available at http://research.microsoft.com/fstar. Related work Programming language abstractions have long been recognized as an essential means for protection (Morris 1973) ; their secure implementations are often specified as full abstraction (Abadi 1998; Abadi et al. 2002; Abadi and Plotkin 2010; Agten et al. 2012) . Conversely, many attacks can be interpreted as failures of abstraction, and several counterexamples to full abstraction exist. For example, Mitchell (1993) notes that Lisp with FEXPR has no abstraction contexts, and Kennedy (2006) points out the lack of full abstraction in translations from C# to .NET.
Many powerful co-inductive techniques exist for program equivalence, with various combinations of types, higher-order functions, private mutable state, and exceptions (Sumii and Pierce 2005; Lassen 2005) . As discussed in §7, ours combines their features so that bisimulations precisely capture the invariants of wrapped translation within untrusted JavaScript contexts. Although employing logical relations instead of bisimulations, Ahmed and Blume (2008) also use type-directed wrappers to prove that typed closure conversion in the polymorphic λ -calculus is fully abstract. However, unlike us, they do not use the wrappers in the translation itself.
There has been recent work on protecting JavaScript programs from malicious contexts. For example, Taly et al. (2011) apply a dataflow analysis to check that programs in a subset of ECMAScript 5's strict mode (lacking getters and setters) do not leak private data to an adversary. Using this analysis, the authors were able to prove the safety of object-capability idioms used by the Caja (2012) framework that rewrites JavaScript applications to confine security-critical objects, such as the DOM, behind object capabilities. This confinement property is related to the invariant enforced by our wrappers, which we check by typing. Taly et al., however, do not deal with full abstraction.
Challenges in secure JavaScript programming
To illustrate the difficulty of writing secure JavaScript code, we naively implement a protection mechanism around a trusted, external function rawSend for posting messages to some target domain (Figure 2 ). By calling mkSend(rawSend), we should obtain a function that enforce the following policy:
• Send messages only to whitelisted URLs (to avoid privacy leaks); of at most 5 characters (to bound resource usage); that includes a secret credential (to identify the service users).
• Do not leak the rawSend function or the secret credential, to prevent bypassing our protection mechanism.
Our implementation calls a sanitize function, hypothetically provided by some other trusted library. As typical in JavaScript, linking is performed dynamically through the global name-space. For simplicity, we use our mechanism to protect an anonymous function that prints the message and its target on the console. The resulting protected send function is exported to the global namespace and therefore made available to untrusted scripts: send = mkSend(function (target, msg) { console.info("Sent " + msg + " to " + target);});
In isolation, our code seems to enforce our policy. However, we are going to demonstrate how, by carefully manipulating the context, a malicious script can bypass our protection mechanism. We do not claim any novelty in describing these attacks (Caja 2012; Taly et al. 2011; Meyerovich and Livshits 2010) : with these examples, we aim at giving our reader a glimpse at the challenges met by security-conscious JavaScript programmers as well as prepare the ground for our defensive wrappers in §6. Attack 1: Overwriting global objects Importing objects from the global name-space is risky: by definition, every script has access to this name-space. For instance, a script can maliciously overwrite the sanitize function right before calling the send operation: sanitize = function (s,msg) { return msg; }; send("http://www.microsoft.com/owa", "too long!");
To prevent this attack, we must run mkSend before any hostile script (first-starter privilege) and store a private copy of sanitize as well as any other trusted library function it may call. A mere regular expression matching on the resulting string lets us extract the list of valid targets. This is not, as such, a violation of the specification, yet it is a rather unusual feature. Attack 3: Redefining Object Since JavaScript is a prototypeoriented programming language, one can dynamically modify properties of any object in the system. In particular, one can add a field to the prototype of the canonical object, Object, hence extending the white list without even referring to whiteList itself:
Object.prototype["http://www.evil.com"] = true; send("http://www.evil.com","msg");
To preclude this attack, we must ensure that any given field is indeed part of the whiteList object, and not inherited from its prototype chain. To this end, we could use a safe private copy (obtained by starting first) of the hasOwnProperty method. Attack 4: Side-effectful implicit coercions Part of the complexity of JavaScript comes from its treatment of coercions: should the need arise, objects are automatically coerced at run-time. Instead of a string, one can, for instance, pass an object with a toString method that returns a string in the whiteList on the first use and another string as the actual send operation is performed:
var count = 0; var target = { toString: function() { return count++ == 0 ? "http://www.microsoft.com/owa" : "http://www.evil.com" }}; send(target, "msg");
To tame these implicit coercions, we may explicitly check that the input arguments are of the correct type, using the typeof operator. Alternatively, we may force a coercion upon receiving the arguments and store the result-this is the case for msg in Figure 2 . Attack 5: Walking the call stack Finally, stepping outside ECMA standards, most implementations of the Function object provide a caller property that points to the current caller of the function being executed. Abusing this mechanism, any callback (such as an implicit coercion or a getter) grants access to the arguments of its caller newSend, including msg after concatenation with This code enables one to retrieve the credential by matching the msg argument. Similarly, one could retrieve any secret on the call stack. To guard against this attack, we must explicitly clear the caller field of our functions before any potential callback.
Our proposal The examples above show that local reasoning about code in JavaScript can be compromised through a variety of attacks. Hence, writing secure code in JavaScript is a hardship: one must take a great deal of attack vectors into account, and one ends up maintaining extremely cumbersome programs, which makes them more error-prone. We propose that programmers instead use a source language with static types and scopes to write security-sensitive code. A compiler should then securely translate the source language to JavaScript, freeing the programmer from thinking about the subtle semantics of JavaScript. In this context, ML appears to be a particularly effective source language: it has static types and scopes; it is functional, so we can rely on closures and higher-order functions also available in JavaScript; and, being impure, we can adopt a programming style that approaches idiomatic JavaScript. In ML, the example of Figure 2 can be written as shown below, which clearly meets the stated security goals.
let mkSend rawSend = let whiteList = ["http://www.microsoft.com/mail"; "http://www.microsoft.com/owa"] in fun target msg → let msg = "["ˆsecret credentialˆ"]"ˆmsg in if mem target whiteList then rawSend target (sanitize 5 msg) else consoleError "Rejected."
Syntax and semantics of f ⋆
In this paper, we use f ⋆ , a fragment of F ⋆ (Swamy et al. 2011 ) similar to ML, with the syntax shown below and a standard, small-step, call-by value semantics (see the full paper). We have extended the original presentation and formal development of F ⋆ with exceptions, fatal errors, and primitive support for a mutable store. Values range over variables, memory locations, abstraction over terms, and n-ary, fully applied data constructors. We add a form of results r, which, in addition to values, includes exceptions raise v and fatal error. Expressions are in a partial administrative normal form, with, for instance, function application e v requiring the argument to be a value. We also have pattern matching, reference allocation, assignment and dereference, and exception handlers. We also freely use common primitive types like int and bool, and expect these to be in the signature as well. Our syntax does not include a fixpoint form because recursion can be encoded with recursive datatypes in the signature. We consider several instantiations of the signature S in this paper, to define our source language ( §4) and to embed dynamically typed JavaScript within f ⋆ ( §5).
Syntactic sugar We write applications e e ′ as abbreviations of let x = e ′ in e x, for some fresh x. A similar transformation applies to pattern matching, reference operations, exception raising, etc. We write if e then e 1 else e 2 for match e with true → e 1 else e 2 , and e 1 ; e 2 for let = e 1 in e 2 . Additionally, in code listings, we rely on the concrete syntax of F ⋆ , which closely resembles OCaml and F#.
Plain types F ⋆ includes various dependent typing features, but we ignore this in f ⋆ , and restrict the types to a monomorphic subset of ML including function types t → t ′ , references, and recursive datatypes. Nevertheless, we have extended our Coq-based metatheory of the full F ⋆ language to include exceptions, state and errors, and proved subject reduction for the reduction of open terms, i.e., terms that may contain free variables, which is used in §7 and §8. We present a specialized version of this theorem below, where we use the type judgment for F ⋆ runtime states. This is written here as S; Γ ⊢ H | e : t, denoting that in an environment including the signature S, free variables Γ, and the typed domain of H (written σ (H), including ℓ : t for each ℓ → t v in H), the store H is well-typed and the expression e has type t. When the signature S is evident from the context, we simply write Γ ⊢ H | e : t. 
A compiler from f ⋆ to JavaScript
We present our compiler from f ⋆ to JavaScript, using the f ⋆ program below as a running example.
Calls to mkLog return an abstract interface to a log, with functions add and iter to extend the log with a string and to operate on its contents, respectively. Reasoning in f ⋆ , it is clear for instance that the log only contains strings and that it grows monotonically. In this section, we illustrate informally how our compiler ensures that all source invariants are preserved in the translation to JavaScript. In subsequent sections, we justify it by formalizing our compiler as a translation from f ⋆ to js ⋆ and proving it fully abstract. The light translation Our compiler proceeds in two phases. The first phase is compositional and purely syntax-directed: the translation function e , shown in Figure 3 , translates f ⋆ constructs to their JavaScript counterparts. Following standard practice, we assume uniqueness of variable names. We also use an auxiliary function, locals (e) , that collects the let-and pattern-bound names not enclosed within additional λ s of expression e.
We translate functions in f ⋆ to functions in JavaScript as follows: Local variable declarations in JavaScript always occur at the top of a function body, so we collect the source locals and declare them upfront. When reading a variable x (the second rule), we simply lookup the JavaScript variable with the same name x. In the third rule, we translate let-bindings to JavaScript sequence expres-
Figure 3. Light translation from f ⋆ to JavaScript sions (x=e0,e1)-in JavaScript, this expression evaluates e0, assigns the result to x, and then evaluates e1. Function application is straightforward. We translate data values D v 0 . . . v n−1 to objects with a tag field recording the name of the constructor as a string, and with fields "0", . . . , str (n − 1) containing the translations of the arguments-the meta-function str encodes its argument as a JavaScript string. References have a single field "ref". When assigning a reference, we update the ref field and then evaluate to undefined, our representation of the ():unit value in JavaScript. We model fatal error in JavaScript by calling the alert function, which pops up a dialog in most browser environments-several other possibilities exist for modeling fatal errors. Finally, we translate matching to JavaScript conditional expressions, e?e0:e1. Observe that the only statement forms we use are within functions, where we use var declarations and return. By relying only on the expression forms of JavaScript, we obtain a simple compositional translation.
For simplicity, the input of the translation does not contain exceptions and their handlers, but we still study their properties for all f ⋆ evaluation contexts (including exceptions). Technically, we also require that f ⋆ does not have ref unit and similar types whose values are all contextually equivalent in f ⋆ but whose translations may be distinguished in JavaScript using untyped equality. Finally, we do not formalize the translation of polymorphic data constructors, although they are supported by our compiler implementation.
At top level, our formalization applies to the translation of programs enclosed within a function. Our implementation augments this with simple handling for top-level let-bindings. Running this on the declaration of mkLog, we obtain the following JavaScript, where List.iter refers to the translation of the f ⋆ function List.iter. function mkLog (u) { var log; var add; var iter; return (log={"ref":{"tag":"Nil"}}, (add=(function(x){ return (log.ref={"tag":"Cons", "0":x, "1":log.ref}, undefined); }), (iter=(function(f){ return (List.iter(f)(log.ref));}), {"tag":"Pair", "0":add, "1":iter})));} Type-directed defensive wrappers Providing a JavaScript context with direct access to mkLog is not fully abstract: an adversary could, for example, call mkLog, obtain iter, and then call it with a function f that (as in attack 5 of §2) walks the stack, accesses log directly from the arguments of List.iter, and breaks its invariants. To protect our code, we apply type-directed wrappers that build a firewall between the lightly translated f ⋆ code and its context.
Our wrappers are JavaScript functions indexed by source types t. They come in pairs: a 'down' wrapper, written ↓ t, takes a light translation of a source value v:t and exports it safely to the context; an 'up' wrapper, written ↑t, takes any JavaScript value supplied by the context and attempts to extract from it a value that is a light translation of some source v:t; this may fail.
In addition to ensuring that the translated f ⋆ code and its context interact at the expected types, the wrappers seek to enforce a strict heap separation between the code and the context. Specifically, we function downunit(x) { return x;} function upunit(x) { return undefined;} function downbool(x) { return x;} function upbool(z) { return (z ? true : false);} function downstring(x) { return x;} function upstring(x) { return (x + "");} function downpair(dn_a, dn_b) { return function (p) { return {"tag":"Pair", "0":
var y = undefined; function stub() { arguments.callee.caller = undefined; arguments.callee.arguments = undefined; y = up_b(f(z)); } stub(); return y; };};} Figure 4 . Selected wrappers in JavaScript ensure that the context never obtains a direct reference to an object that is used by the light translation; references from f ⋆ objects to objects owned by the context (we call such objects untrusted, or un, objects) are also problematic, since the contents of un objects are unreliable, e.g., they may change unexpectedly. So, access to f ⋆ objects by the attacker, and vice versa, are mediated by wrappers. Figure 4 lists some wrappers used by our compiler. For immutable base types shared between f ⋆ and JavaScript, such as strings, the 'down' wrapper does nothing, whereas the 'up' wrapper forces a coercion. There are various JavaScript idioms that serve to induce coercions at particular types, e.g., for Booleans, we use an explicit conditional expression; for numbers, we use unary addition; for strings, we concatenate with the empty string, etc. This ensures, for instance, that true and false are indeed the only imported Boolean values, foiling problems like attack 4 from §2.
For datatypes such as pairs and lists (and any allocated data), we must ensure that wrapping preserves heap separation. Thus, we allocate a fresh representation and recursively wrap their contents. The 'up' wrapper is safe even as its code accesses fields (which may trigger callbacks to the context via implicit coercions or getters) because the imported content is kept as a local value on the 'up' wrapper stack. Our code includes wrapper generators; for instance, downpair takes as parameter two 'down' wrappers for types a and b and returns a 'down' wrapper for pairs containing an a and a b.
For functions, the situation is more complex, since the 'up' wrapper has no way to check that its argument is the valid representation of a source f ⋆ function. Instead, the wrapping is deferred: the function downfun, corresponding to ↓ (a → b), exports a function f by wrapping it with another function that first imports the argument x, then applies f, and finally exports the result. In the other direction, one might have expected upfun (for ↑ (a → b)) to be strictly dual to ↓ (a → b), i.e., export the argument, apply the function, and import the result. However, this is insufficient. As attack 5 of §2 illustrates, the JavaScript calling convention provides a function with access to the function object and arguments of its caller. If a trusted function were to call an untrusted one directly, the latter obtains a reference to the arguments of the former, breaking our heap separation discipline.
To this end, following the code of upfun in Figure 4 , the wrapper for importing an untrusted function f (purportedly the translation of an a → b value) is itself a function, callable from any trusted context, that first exports its argument into a local variable z, then calls a fresh, single-use stub. The stub makes the call to f on behalf of the trusted code, but before doing so, it clears its own caller and arguments object. When the call to f proceeds, the context obtains a reference to the stub, but cannot walk the stack beyond the stub and compromise trusted code. After the untrusted call completes, up_b wraps up the result and stores it in y. (Returning the value directly is dangerous, since the attacker has a pointer to the stub closure, so, it may be able to call this closure later and receive the protected value.) After the stub completes, the wrapper returns the contents of the local variable y. Thus, to an attacker that attempts to traverse the call stack via the caller/callee properties, the stack (growing downward) appears as depicted alongside. Walking upward, untraversable stub objects delimit regions of the stack that transition from untrusted to trusted code. Additionally, the up and down wrappers mediate all calls across trust boundaries. Top-level translation Continuing with our example, we list below the script that makes mkLog available to an arbitrary JavaScript context after suitable wrapping. Rather than placing mkLog directly into the global name-space (i.e., the window object in a web browser), our compiler generates a function init that takes the window object as a parameter, defines the lightly translated code of mkLog in a local variable, and exports it to window.mkLog after unfolding and applying the down-wrapper ↓(unit → (string → unit * (string → unit) → unit)). After running init(window), our script overwrites init to prevent any later use (such as init.toString()). function init(w) { function mkLog(u){. . .} // light translation shown above w.mkLog= downfun (upunit, downpair(downfun(upstring, downunit), downfun(upfun(downstring, upunit) , downunit)))(mkLog); } init(window); init=undefined;
Threats and countermeasures We briefly review potential threats to full abstraction, and informally discuss how we handle them.
• Modifying Object.prototype can override the default behavior of objects, e.g. when accessing their properties. As an invariant, translated f ⋆ code never triggers a prototype chain traversal, so our translation does not depend on Object.prototype.
• By changing Function.prototype.apply, an adversary can interpose code at function calls. However, ECMAScript 5 states that this interception does not affect primitive function calls.
• Function.toString returns the static source of a function closure as a string. Our wrappers ensure that, for any function g handed to the adversary, g.toString() always returns the text of its down wrapper, that is, the constant string "function (z) { return (down_b (f (up_a(z)))); }"
• Implicit coercions are pre-empted by systematically forcing coercions in 'up' wrappers.
• Stack walks via callee and caller properties are countered by the stub mechanism described above.
• Some browsers provide (new Error()).stack, which dumps the current stack as a string. Assuming that our code runs first, we disable it in the init function, using the code below. Are these countermeasures sufficient? The rest of the paper, culminating with the main results of §8, provide a positive answer, at least within our semantics of JavaScript.
A semantics of JavaScript in f ⋆
We begin our formal development with a semantics of JavaScript by translation to js ⋆ , the instance of f ⋆ with inductive signature JSExec described below; this allows us to carry out our full-abstraction argument entirely within a single language. We base our semantics on λ JS, a dynamically typed language to which Guha et al. (2010) translate JavaScript. We extend λ JS to include some features of ECMAScript 5 that were missing in the original formulation (which targeted ECMAScript 3), as well as browser-specific features that are relevant for full abstraction. Concurrently, Politz et al. (2012) have extended λ JS to cover the strict mode of ECMAScript 5.
We focus on a few main features of js ⋆ : dynamic typing, object properties, function creation, the calling convention, control operators, and eval. We refer to our technical report for a complete presentation, including a formal translation from λ JS to js ⋆ .
Dynamic typing. In order to type any JavaScript values, JSExec defines dyn, a standard 'type dynamic', as follows. The type dyn has a constructor for each JavaScript primitive type. For instance, the JavaScript string literal "Rome" is represented as Str "Rome": dyn. Objects are references to maps from string (property names) to property, the type of values or accessors (getters and setters). Their property attributes attrs specify, for instance, whether they are writable or enumerable. (Our translation does not rely on attributes for security.) Getters and setters are treated as functions, called to perform property lookups or assignments. Functions in JavaScript are also objects-one may set properties on them, writing, for instance, function foo(){}; foo.x = 17. To handle this, we represent JavaScript functions as js ⋆ values Fun o f, constructed from a function object o:dyn and a closure f. All functions in JavaScript receive an implicit this parameter and, following λ JS, a single argument object with a field for each of their explicit arguments. Thus, the closure f within Fun o f has type dyn → dyn → dyn. We discuss the three kinds of exceptions shortly.
Function creation and application While outside the ECMAScript specification, most browsers implement a quirk in their calling convention. Functions f receive their (variable number of) arguments in single arguments objects. These objects include a callee field that points to the function object of f. Conversely, function objects include an arguments field that points back to the argument object of their last activation, if any, and a caller field that points back to the function object of their last caller. (This field may point to f itself, if it makes recursive calls, or be null, for top-level calls.) These fields are implicitly updated at every call. In particular, all JavaScript functions are recursive through the store, since they are given access to their own object.
To model this calling convention, JSExec defines several operations. First, a lookup function looks up the property name f in the map of an object (accounting for function values as well).
Similarly, a modify function updates properties within object maps. In this section, we use shorthands for these functions:
To allocate functions, JSExec defines mkFun as follows: where the first argument is a string literal that represents the source text of the function and the second argument is a js ⋆ closure that receives three objects: the (soon-to-be-created) function object o, the 'this' parameter, and the actual arguments. The call to mkFun allocates o, partially applies the closure to o, and sets various properties on o before returning f.
To call functions, JSExec provides apply, which receives four arguments: caller, the object of the calling function; callee, the function to be called; a this pointer; and an args object.
let apply (caller:dyn) (callee:dyn) (this:dyn) (args:dyn) : dyn = match callee with | (Fun o f) → let caller0 = o⟨"caller"⟩ in let args0 = o⟨"arguments"⟩ in try o⟨"caller"⟩ = caller⟨"@code"⟩; o⟨"arguments"⟩ = args; args⟨"callee"⟩ = callee; f this args with Break → error | e → raise e finally (o⟨"caller"⟩ = caller0; o⟨"arguments"⟩ = args0) | ...
Following the code, apply calls f with argument this and args. First, however, it saves the callee's caller and arguments fields, sets these fields for the current call, and sets a pointer from args to callee. Conversely, once the call returns, apply restores the callee's fields to their old value. (The derived f ⋆ form try ... with ... finally, detailed below, ensures that the fields are restored even if the call raises an exception.) Experimentally, this reflects major browser implementations of JavaScript.
Property access In JavaScript, properties of objects are looked up first in the object's own property map, then in the object's prototype (stored in a special property "@proto"), walking the prototype chain as needed. Once found, if the property happens to be a getter, then the getter function is called, otherwise its value is returned. This is implemented by the select function, shown below. Since calling the getter requires passing a caller object, we write select caller l f to select field f from object l in the context of the function object caller. (Recall that the translation of our example function included a call to select passing its object o as a parameter.) let rec getProperty (l:dyn) (f:string) = match lookup l f with
A similar function, update caller l f v, sets property f on object l to value v. This function traverses the prototype chain looking for a setter for property f. If a setter is found, update calls it with caller and v; otherwise it calls modify l f v.
Exceptions and control operators
We model exceptions and the other imperative control operators of JavaScript using f ⋆ exceptions. JavaScript has a return statement to end the current call, and a break l statement to return control to the code location labeled l, which must be defined within the same function body. λ JS desugars both to a single form, which we represent as the exception Break l v. Additionally, we use exceptions Exn v for JavaScript exceptions, and Return v to encode finally clauses, as follows. Contextual equivalence in JavaScript (discussion) After translation to js ⋆ , we formally compare JavaScript programs using the contextual equivalence of §3 (Definition 1). This equivalence relies on the observation of fatal errors, which are not primitive in JavaScript, but informally account for any code with an immediate observable effect, such as alert("error") or window.location = "http://error.com". This equivalence in js ⋆ is also a priori finer than JavaScript equivalence, inasmuch as it quantifies over all welltyped js ⋆ contexts, not just those obtained by translating JavaScript contexts. Thus, we err on the safe side: most of our results would apply unchanged for variants and extensions of JSExec (as long as its signature is unchanged), for instance, to model additional features of JavaScript implementations. Conversely, §8 shows that translations of JavaScript contexts are complete at least for interacting with wrapped translated f ⋆ programs.
6. A type-preserving simulation from f ⋆ to js ⋆ Formally, our compiler can be viewed as the translation from f ⋆ to JavaScript ( §4) composed with the embedding of JavaScript into js ⋆ ( §5). In this light, its correctness is far from obvious. For example, even though superficially we translate f ⋆ functions to JavaScript functions, several corner cases of their semantics lurk beneath the surface syntax. As we have seen, functional values translate to expressions that allocate several objects, and are subject to a calling convention with side-effects. This section proves several safety properties for the f ⋆ -to-js ⋆ compiler. In order to carry out these proofs, we use an alternative, monadic type system for f ⋆ due to , as well as an application of this type system to JavaScript provided by . Specifically, we use JSVerify, a variant of JSExec with monadically refined types that allows us to state and prove precise typing and heap invariants of js ⋆ programs. Using this machinery, we prove that the light translation preserves types and is a (weak) forward simulation. Additionally, we prove that the defensive wrappers successfully maintain several key invariants, including separating un objects from the others. While useful in their own right for whole programs (e.g., we can prove that when a source f ⋆ program has no assertion failures, then neither does its translation), these properties serve primarily as lemmas that facilitate the main results of §8. Monadic f ⋆ The type system of monadic f ⋆ is based on a monad of predicate transformers called the Dijkstra state monad. The type of this monad is written DST t wp, and stands for stateful computations yielding a t result and with specification described by the weakest pre-condition predicate transformer wp. The transformer wp takes a post-condition formula post, relating a result of type t and a final heap, and returns a pre-condition formula pre, a predicate on an initial heap. Given a program e : DST t wp and a particular post-condition post to be proven, the f ⋆ type checker
Syntax of types in monadic f
builds a verification condition wp post and uses Z3, an SMT solver (de Moura and Bjørner 2008), to try to discharge the proof.
We give the syntax of monadic f ⋆ types above. As in §3, the type language is parameterized by a signature S that also defines a set of type constructors T . Types include variables a, type applications t t ′ , refinement types x:t{ϕ }, and polymorphic types ∀a::κ.t. Data constructors are n-ary and are given pure dependent function types ∀a::κ.x:t → t ′ . General function types have the form x:t → DST t ′ ϕ , with a monadic co-domain dependent on the curried arguments x:t.
Formulas ϕ include the usual connectives (implication is written =⇒ , distinguishing it from the kind constructor ⇒ discussed below). Predicates P may be interpreted (e.g. equality), although uninterpreted predicates can be introduced by the signature S. Formulas also include a strongly normalizing applicative language of functions over logical terms and other predicates. We write λ x:t.ϕ and Λa::κ.ϕ for predicate literals or, in the latter case, for transformers from a predicate (or type) a of kind κ to ϕ . Formulas can be applied to other formulas or to logical terms u.
The type system is parametric in the logic used to interpret formulas. By default, we use a first-order logic with uninterpreted functions and theories of functional arrays, arithmetic, datatypes, and equality. For example, we use type heap and interpreted functions Sel: heap → ref α→ α and Upd: heap → ref α→ α→ heap from the select/update theory of functional arrays (McCarthy 1962) to model the store. Logic terms also include three kinds of result constructors: V v is a result value; E v is an exceptional result; and err is the error value. We define asResult v V v, asResult (raise v) E v, and asResult error E. Additionally, we write Result r ϕ as an abbreviation asserting that ϕ x is valid when r = V x.
We have two base kinds: ⋆ is the kind given to value types, while E is the kind of types that stand for erasable specifications, with the sub-kinding relation ⋆ ≤ E. We include dependent function kinds, both from types to kinds, and from kinds to kinds. In most cases, unless we feel it adds clarity, we omit writing kinds.
The main judgments in the monadic type system are S; Γ ⊢ D v : t for values and S; Γ ⊢ D e : DST t ϕ for expressions. They rely on an auxiliary judgment, S; Γ |= ϕ , stating that formula ϕ is derivable from the logical refinements of context Γ. For example, we can type the program λ x:ref int.x :=!x + 1 as x:ref int → DST unit Λpost.λ h:heap.post (V ()) (Upd h x ((Sel h x) + 1)). This is the type of a function from integer references x to unit, where the weakest pre-condition for any predicate post relating a unit result to the output heap is the formula post (V ()) (Upd h ((Sel h x) + 1)), indicating that the function always returns normally with () and updates the input heap h with the contents of location x incremented.
The judgments for typing terms extend naturally to a judgment on runtime states, written S; Γ ⊢ D H | e : DST t ϕ . The soundness theorem for monadic f ⋆ is a refinement of Theorem 1; it also applies to open reductions. In its statement below, we rely on a function asHeap that interprets a store H as a Sel/Upd value of type heap.
Theorem 3 (Monadic soundness). Given S, Γ, H, e, t, ϕ such that S; Γ ⊢ D H | e : DST t ϕ , and a post-condition ψ such that S; Γ |= ϕ ψ (asHeap H) is derivable; either: (1) e is a result and S; Γ |= ψ (asResult e) (asHeap H); (2) e is an open redex; or (3) there exist H
We sometimes use a monad iDST, an abbreviation for the DST monad augmented with a heap invariant: iDST t wp is the type of a computation that, when run with an input heap h satisfying HeapInv h ∧ wp post h, diverges or produces an output heap h' and result r:t satisfying HeapInv h' ∧ DeltaHeap h h' ∧ post r h'. We describe the heap invariants enforced by iDST below, referring to our online material for the full definitions.
JSVerify: a precise typed model of JSExec We now present a few key elements in JSVerify, an interface for JSExec written using the precise types of monadic f ⋆ . We start by showing how we recover the precision of the source type system by refining the type dyn introduced in §5. A central feature of this refinement is JSVerify's model of a partitioned js ⋆ heap. We conclude this subsection with a lemma relating JSExec to JSVerify.
Dynamic typing We structure our formal development by translating the types of f ⋆ into logical formulas. Specifically, we use a refinement of type dynamic developed by to embed the simple type language of f ⋆ within the refinement logic of monadic f ⋆ . For example, rather than typing Str "Rome" simply as dyn, we type it as x:dyn{TypeOf x = string}, where TypeOf is an uninterpreted function from values to E-kinded types.
We show a few cases in the definition of type dyn used in JSVerify below. The full listing of JSVerify is available online.
As in JSExec, an object is a value Obj l, for some heap reference l:loc. In addition, the refinement on the Obj constructor recalls the refinement on the underlying loc. The Fun constructor takes two value arguments, an object o and a function closure, as before. In addition, it now takes a specificational argument: a predicate transformer wp for the function closure. The refinement on the argument o requires it to be an object (in addition to some other properties, which we elide from this presentation). The function closure is itself typed within the iDST monad with weakest precondition wp. The type of Fun recalls the predicate transformer of the closure in its result type, i.e., TypeOf d=WP wp where WP is a type-level coercion from the kind of wp to E.
Invariants of a partitioned heap Our proof strategy involves enriching the type of heap references to keep track of a logical partition of the js ⋆ heap into five compartments. This partition allows us to prove several invariants, e.g., that there are no references from objects in the attacker-controlled part of the heap to elsewhere. These five heap compartments are as follows:
Inv: the invariant heap Let-bound variables, arguments and data are immutable in f ⋆ but are held in heap locations in js ⋆ . To keep track of these locations, we place them in a logical compartment called the Inv heap. A complication that we handle is that these locations are not strictly immutable-JavaScript forces us to preallocate locals, requiring a mutation after allocation, and the calling convention also involves implicit effects. Still, we prove that, once set, all the relevant fields of objects in the Inv heap never change. Abs: the abstract heap of function objects Recall that every function in js ⋆ is associated with a heap-allocated object whose contents is updated at every function call. We place these unstable locations in the Abs heap, and ensure that translated source programs never read or write from these locations, i.e., function objects are abstract.
Un: the untrusted heap This heap compartment is used to model locations under control of the attacker. Our full-abstraction result relies crucially on a strict heap separation to ensure that locations from the other compartments never leak into the Un heap (with one exception, discussed next).
Stub: the heap of declassified function objects Function objects corresponding to stubs in the upfun wrapper are allocated in a compartment of their own. These objects initially belong to the f ⋆ translation, but, once used, they become accessible from the Un heap. To this end, we implement (and type) a logical declassification protocol, allowing us to prove that, as their ownership is transferred to the attacker, stub objects do not leak any information.
To keep track of these heap compartments, JSVerify enriches the representation of heap allocated objects with (ghost) metadata, outlined below. We have a tag for each compartment. The type tobj, which is a wrapper around the type obj, associates it with its tag and a predicate p, an invariant on the contents of the object. 
The translation for primitive types like string is simple: the refinement formula ϕ string requires the translated value to be a Str : dyn. The translation of ref t requires an object in the Ref heap, whose "ref" field satisfies predicate ϕ t . The translation of function types ϕ t→t ′ requires the compiled value to be a Fun wp term, where (among other requirements) the predicate transformer wp requires its zeroth argument to satisfy ϕ t , and requires proving the post-condition on a result r that satisfies ϕ t ′ (if it is a value).
Interface of JSVerify To enforce our invariants, JSVerify exposes a monadic version of the JSExec interface. To operate on un values, for instance, it provides aliases to the functions select, update, and apply of §5. An un value is either a primitive value, or an object (or function) allocated in the Un heap, or a declassified Stub object. The function selectUn allows a (non-internal) field to be selected from an un object. Its pre-condition requires both the caller and the object o to be un-values, and requires the post-condition p to be proven for any IsUn result and heap (since, via getters, selecting a field can trigger arbitrary code). The specification for updating an un object is similar. Calling an un function requires that the caller be an un value, both this and args be un, and ensures that the result is also un. In all cases, the use of the iDST monad requires and ensures the heap invariant as well.
Accessing the other heaps imposes stricter requirements but also provides more guarantees.
Relating JSExec and JSVerify To relate our two interfaces, we prove a lemma that shows that any js ⋆ program well-typed against JSExec is also well-typed against JSVerify, as long as it interacts only with the Un-fragment of JSVerify. To state this lemma, and in the rest of the paper, we use the following syntactic shorthands:
• We write S; Γ ⊢ D e : t for a computation with a trivial precondition returning a t-result, i.e., S; Γ ⊢ D e : iDST t wp ⊤ , where S; Γ |= ∀h.HeapInv h=⇒ wp ⊤ (λ h'.HeapInv h'∧DeltaHeap h h')h.
• Γ D is the lifting of function types in the context Γ, where a type t → t' is lifted to x:t → iDST t' wp ⊤ . When it is clear from the context, we write types like t → t', leaving the lifting implicit.
• tagUn(H | e) is the runtime state obtained by adding Un-tags to each object and loc-typed constant in H | e. compartments. The subscript f is a js ⋆ value, representing the object of the function that encloses e; it is Null at the top-level. Figure 5 gives five representative translation rules, simplifying them by eliding type arguments. The rules are to be interpreted as inlining the definitions from JSVerify into the translated term, rather than leaving them as free variables.
The first rule translates a data constructor to an object literal, which in JSVerify is represented as an Inv location that is allocated and immediately initialized with the contents of the constructor. This is particularly important-the alternative of allocating an object first, and then setting its fields is not secure, since, in general, this could cause a traversal of the prototype chain, triggering attacker code in case the attacker has installed a setter on the publicly available Object.prototype. In contrast, the allocation of an object literal never causes a prototype traversal.
The second rule translates a let-or λ -bound source variable x to a js ⋆ expression that selects from the "0" field of an object stored in the Inv heap, whose location is bound to a js ⋆ variable of the same name. The invariant guarantees that the "0" field is set in the immediate object, again preventing any prototype traversal.
The third rule translates a closure. Function objects in the light translation are always allocated in the Abs heap. So, we use an alias of JSExec.mkFun from JSVerify called mkFunAbs, which builds the function object. We translate the body of the function using the variable o as the caller object, passed as an argument to applyAbs (an alias of JSExec.apply for calling an Abs function) at every callsite in the body of e, as shown in the next rule. Again, the arguments are passed as an object literal.
The last rule is useful primarily for translating runtime expressions, rather than source values. f ⋆ has an applicative semantics with a standard β -reduction rule. However, in js ⋆ , values are passed as pointers to the Inv (or sometimes Abs) heap. Without this last rule, this mismatch would cause considerable technical difficulties in our forward simulation proof. For example, in f ⋆ we may have
When translating the left-hand side, we may allocate only one D in js ⋆ , whereas, the translation of the right-hand side would allocate two objects. To reflect both possibilities, the light translation is a non-deterministic relation on runtime states, indexed by the js ⋆ heap I, representing pre-allocated data. So, in the last rule, if we find a location ℓ in the I heap which already contains a value that is a valid translation of the source value v, then, rather than allocate a fresh location, we may simply translate v to the expression that selects from ℓ. As such, our translation relation conveniently hides the details of data allocation and aliasing-our typed invariant and §8 show that those details are not observable anyway.
Correctness of the light translation
We present our main results for the light translation, first stating that it preserves the typing and heap invariants, then that it is a forward simulation: every f ⋆ reduction is matched by one or more js ⋆ reductions.
Type preservation states that if an f ⋆ state H | e well-typed at t is translated to a js ⋆ state H ′ | e ′ (with Inv and Abs heaps I), then the js ⋆ state is well-typed in the iDST monad against JSVerify. The lemma ensures that when h0 (the logical value corresponding to I and H ′ ) satisfies the heap invariant, the js ⋆ state diverges, or produces a result r and post-heap h1, where h1 satisfies the heap invariant and DeltaHeap h0 h1; and that Result r ϕ t is valid. As a base case, the heap invariant on the empty heap (produced when translating a source program, rather than an intermediate runtime configuration) is trivially satisfied. A technical requirement, due to JavaScript's hoisting of local variables, is that all the let-bound variables of the translated term already exist in the heap I. 
Our next lemma ensures that the formal light translation is a forward simulation. That is, every reduction step of an f ⋆ program H | e is matched by one or more reductions of its js ⋆ translation. We use an auxiliary function Abs I, standing for the set of objects that may be used as the caller object in js ⋆ : , where g ∈ Abs (I, I ′ ). Defensive wrappers We now consider the properties of the second phase of our compiler, i.e., the defensive wrappers. Figure 6 lists the js ⋆ code of downfun and upfun-it is instructive to compare with the JavaScript wrappers shown in Figure 4 . This code is typed against JSVerify, making use of the heap-partition-aware variants of functions in JSExec. This allows us to record the code positions that may trigger callbacks to untrusted code (which leaks the caller's object to the context). Specifically, we use the following variants of mkFun, apply, select, and update.
• abs-functions reside in the Abs heap and are created by mkFunAbs.
They may be called with any caller using applyAnyAbs.
• un-functions are created by mkFunUn with an object o:un. They are called using applyUnUn, that is, only by callers with an un object (since this object is possibly leaked to the callee) and un arguments. Similarly, Un objects are selected using selectUn, possibly triggering a callback to the context (due to a getter).
• stub-functions specifically support our 'upfun' wrapper. They are created by mkFunStub with an object in the Stub compartment. They can be called at most once by any caller using applyAnyStub, after which they are declassified and released to the context. Prior to the declassification, stub objects are safethey can be updated without triggering callbacks.
• Local variables and data constructors are allocated in the Inv heap using mkLocalInv and mkInv, respectively. These local variables may be set at most once, using setInv, then selected many times using selectInv. These calls never trigger callbacks.
• Mutable references are allocated using mkRef, and accessed using selectRef and updateRef. . To facilitate proofs of these typing properties, we instrument the js ⋆ wrappers with calls to JSVerify, rather than JSExec, as already noted. Additionally, we require two verification hints in the code of upfun. First, we add a call to a ghost function declassify, which is used to record in the refinement logic that the stub object has been released to the attacker and should henceforth be typed as un. A pre-condition of declassify u callee is that the all the fields of callee must already by typeable as un. Hence, we clear the contents of its "caller" and "arguments" fields. However, the callee object also has an internal field called "@code" containing a reference to the function closure itself, which the adversary can use to call the stub directly, once it has access to the stub function object (e.g., by using Function.prototype.apply). JavaScript provides no way to clear the "@code" field directly. To handle this case, we carefully ensure that, after declassification, the function closure can be typed as a function from un to un. Thus, the stub returns its result via a side-effect to the reference by. Typing this idiom requires one level of indirection: we initialize the reference by to None and, each time the stub is called and successfully imports the translation of let downfun = mkFunAbs "downfun" (fun (apair:inv) → mkFunAbs "downfun_a2b" (fun (af:inv) → mkFunUn "downfun_f" (fun (u:un) ( :un) (az:un) → let up a = selectInv u apair "0" in let z = selectUn u az "0" in let x = applyUnUn u up a global (mkArgUn z) in let f = selectInv u af "0" in let y = applyAnyAbs u f global (mkArgInv x) in let down b = selectInv u apair "1" in applyAnyAbs u down b global (mkArgInv y)))) let upfun = mkFunAbs "upfun" (fun (apair:inv) → mkFunUn "upfun_a2b" (fun (af:un) → mkFunAbs "upfun_f" (fun (o:abs) (ax:inv) → let az = mkLocalInv() in let by = mkRef (mkInv [("tag", Str "None")]) in let down a = selectInv apair "0" in let x = selectInv o ax "0" in setInv o az "0" (applyAnyAbs o down a global (mkArgInv x)); let stub = mkFunStub "stub" (fun (u:stub) ( :un) (a0:stub) → let callee = selectStub u a0 "callee" in updateStub u callee "caller" Undef; updateStub u callee "arguments" Undef; declassify u callee; ( * ghost * ) Figure 4 , we collapse the option reference into a single mutable location, which is a simple semantics preserving transformation.)
Equipped with these types, we show that a down-wrapped light translation has type un. Likewise, we show that, if an up-wrapped un value returns normally, then it returns a value typed as the translation of its source type. In the lemma statement, we write ↓t e for the application of a down wrapper to e, i.e., applyAnyAbs ( : abs) ↓ t ( : un) e; and ↑ t e is applyUnUn ( : un) ↑ t ( : un) e. In conjunction with Lemma 2, this shows that a wrapped term can be safely embedded in any JavaScript context.
Lemma 5 (Typing of wrapped terms).
If Γ ⊢ D v : [[t]] then Γ ⊢ D ↓t v : un; if Γ ⊢ D v : un then Γ ⊢ D ↑t v : [[t]].
Contextual equivalence by bisimulation in f ⋆
Contextual equivalence is a precise and intuitive notion of equivalence, both in JavaScript and in f ⋆ , but it leads to complicated direct proofs, as one needs to reason about any reduction in any context. To structure our full-abstraction proof, and to analyze interactions between translations of equivalent f ⋆ expressions and their js ⋆ contexts, we develop a custom labeled bisimulation proof technique. Although formally independent of JavaScript, the design of our bisimulation is guided by its application to source f ⋆ and js ⋆ in §8:
• Our bisimulation must support f ⋆ types, higher order functions, mutable state, exceptions, divergence, and errors.
• Functions exported using 'down' wrappers may share private state, so we need to jointly relate configurations of functions, rather than single functions. (See also Sumii and Pierce 2005.) • Our wrappers stop at imported and exported functions; thus, to extend wrapping from terms to configurations and maintain wrapping as a transition invariant, we use a variant of normal form bisimulation (Lassen 2005): our configurations have free variables standing for the functions imported from the context; thus, any callback yields a transition output with a continuation.
Next, we define these bisimulation configurations and we study their behavior, first using concrete context closures, then more abstract labeled transitions. The main result of the section is that labeled bisimilarity coincides with contextual equivalence.
We use interfaces to specify how configurations may interact with their context. An interface declares some exported functions (previously sent to the context), some imported functions (previously received from the context), some continuations (for ongoing calls to the context), and some memory (shared with the context). 
Definition 6 (Interface
In this section and §8, we omit the inductive signature S in typing judgments, and write ';' instead of ',' to separate references from functions in typing environments. In the definition, I is a pair of private heaps, with I and I having possibly different domains, both disjoint from σ . (The typing judgments imply dom(σ ) ∩ dom(σ (I)) = / 0.) The substitutions ρ map every variable in Γ x ⊎ Γ k to functions; in particular, continuations are just functions. The environment (Γ|y) z let us type them with free variables standing for previously-imported functions.
Next, we lift the contextual equivalence of §3 from terms to configurations, relying on generalized contexts and context closure: − −− → I ′ ⊢ C ′ where α and β range over input and output labels, respectively. The input label (e.g., a function call with parameters, or returning a result to a previous call) is provided by the context to the configuration, and the output label is its response (e.g., a returned value or a callback). The transition occurs only if both terms in the configuration C have matching behaviors (e.g., both return the same result, call the same callback, etc). Thus, the transition relation characterizes pairs of f ⋆ runtime states that have similar interactions with their context.
• a query q = y r, of one of the three forms below:
x r, a call to any x : a function previously exported by the configuration, or returns from a previous call from the configuration to the context; O represents some shared heap, and Γ ′ z some fresh variables standing for any function imported by this input from the context. In combination, we obtain a pair of well-typed (open) runtime states Γ z , Γ ′ z ⊢ O, I | y ρ v applying the function associated with y in ρ to v. In the last two forms of query, the condition on Γ k ensures that the context returns only at the top of the stack (with a value or an exception). The final condition ensures that no function values are passed directly to the configuration. In particular, the context cannot directly pass a function x previously received from the configuration. Instead, the context can pass a fresh variable z, and can later call x whenever z is called back. x . For convenience, to deal with both kinds of inputs, we write Γ \ k y for Γ when y : x ∈ Γ and for Γ \ y when Γ k = Γ ′ k , y : . We also let Γ + abbreviate Γ \ z y, Γ ′ z , Γ ′′ x in the interface after the output. The lemma statements below account for the non-determinism of our translation: for soundness, collects all configuration translations defined above; for completeness, ′ collects all configuration translations without stub callbacks. We obtain our main theorem for programs seen as singleton configurations. 
Definition 21 (Configuration Translation

Lemma 22 (Soundness). If I ⊢ C ∈ ≈ E then I ⊢ C ⊆ ≈ E .
Lemma 23 (Completeness). If
I ⊢ C ′ ∩≈ E ̸ = / 0 then I ⊢ C ∈ ≈ E .
Preliminary case studies and discussion
Although we leave an extensive evaluation of our compiler as future work, we have already used it to program several small case studies (available on the web)-we briefly describe two of these here.
Secure subsystems A traditional challenge in JavaScript programming involves combining code from multiple, mutually distrusting sources, while maintaining a degree of control over the resulting mash-up. One design towards this objective could be to implement a subsystem in f ⋆ that mediates mash-up interactions, prove it correct using monadic f ⋆ , and then deploy it using our compiler.
To illustrate our point, we have implemented an interferencefree local store on top of the localStorage object in HTML 5, which offers a key-value store per web page. The challenge is that this resource is shared between all scripts running in a web page: they can all read, write, and even clear the whole storage without any access control. To enable mash-ups to use local storage, we implement a secure API setItem, getItem, and removeItem that multiplexes access to localStorage while ensuring isolation.
Advising JavaScript Meyerovich and Livshits (2010) propose CONSCRIPT, a browser-based implementation of aspect-oriented advice for JavaScript, itself expressed as JavaScript code. In preliminary experiments, we have been able to implement 6 CONSCRIPT policies in f ⋆ . Being written in f ⋆ makes the advice simpler: we can prove correctness of the advice by contextual equivalence at the source level, and, unlike CONSCRIPT, we do not require any browser modifications.
Performance The benefits of running secure JavaScript come at a price, as any interactions with untrusted code are mediated by wrappers. The cost of wrapping, however, is proportionate only to the number of "boundary crossings" between trusted and untrusted code. When executing within f ⋆ , there is little overhead due to security protections. Nevertheless, we expect to improve our translation, with an eye towards performance, along several axes. For example, our current representation of datatypes is naïve. We might instead use JavaScript's ArrayBuffer, which offers a packed data representation. For the wrappers, rather than exporting data by copying, we plan to investigate using Object.freeze, a new feature that dynamically renders the fields of an object immutable. We are also considering using a lazy semantics for the wrappers that import data (possibly using proxies of the forthcoming ES6 standard). This would necessitate reflecting the callbacks in the source semantics, as lazy importing may trigger callbacks to the context as imported data is read, but the performance gains may make this a good tradeoff.
Conclusions It is increasingly common for compilers to target JavaScript, contributing to a growing view of JavaScript as the "assembly language of the Web". Our work provides a foundation for such compilers, particularly when compiled code must interact with code from other, less trustworthy sources. Relying on full abstraction, developers who program in higher level languages such as ML can reliably and securely deploy their code, without having to worry about the intricacies of JavaScript.
